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The Press as Storyteller




The reports that journalists offer are not called “stories” by accident. This 
chapter analyzes a series of cases, in wars, electoral campaigns, and policy 
debates, in which dramatic stories framed coverage and overwhelmed the facts. 
As a result, inaccuracies passed into news and the public was left misinformed.
Keywords:   campaign news, framing, journalism, news stories, policy debates, public opinion, war news
The reports that journalists offer their readers, listeners, and viewers are not 
called “stories” by accident. By arranging information into structures with 
antagonists, central conflicts, and narrative progression, journalists deliver the 
world to citizens in a comprehensible form. But the stories that journalists tell 
and the lenses that color their interpretation of events can sometimes dull their 
fact‐finding and investigative instincts.
In the illustrations that follow, we describe instances in which reporters failed to 
investigate and locate the facts that would have undercut the coherence of a 
story being told because the lens they adopted made fact‐finding seem 
unnecessary or irrelevant. In the first set of cases, while replaying coherent, 
compelling stories, reporters missed facts that would have disrupted the story 
line even though the story line itself was being disputed. In the second set, 
involving events in times of crisis or war, government‐blessed versions of fact 
were uncritically embraced and deceptions tacitly forgiven.
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Of course politicians cast the world in stories, too. Political actors argue through 
the use of narrative for a number of reasons. First, they understand that 
narrative has persuasive power; when arguments are arranged into stories, they 
are more readily recalled and more easily believed. Second, they understand the 
reporter's preference for good stories around which news can be built. If a story 
is compelling enough, it can increase the chances that coherent but inaccurate 
information will pass through to the public, as is the case in our first example 
from the 1988 presidential campaign.
 (p.2) The Horton Menace
The 1988 presidential election produced a telling case in which the press failed 
to challenge facts that sounded plausible because they completed a dramatic 
narrative. Seeing the story through the lens of strategy and tactics, reporters 
neglected their role as custodian of fact. What were the facts? William Horton, 
who had been convicted as an accessory to a felony murder for his part in a 
robbery in which a young man was murdered, was released from a 
Massachusetts prison on a furlough. He jumped furlough and traveled to 
Maryland, where he held a couple hostage, stabbed the man and raped his 
fiancée. The Bush campaign used the story to paint the Democratic nominee, 
Massachusetts governor Michael Dukakis, as soft on crime.
Whether or not the Horton story accurately symbolized Dukakis's record on 
crime, George H. W. Bush's embellishment of it and the press's failure to 
challenge the untruths the vice president told as he repeated the story provide 
an excellent example of the power of narrative to overwhelm concern about fact. 
On the stump, for example, Bush alleged that “Willie Horton was in jail, found 
guilty by a jury of his peers for murdering a seventeen‐year‐old kid after 
torturing him.”1 There is no direct evidence that Horton killed Joseph Fournier, 
and nothing on which to base a charge of torture. The untrue claim that Horton 
had cut off Fournier's genitals and stuffed them in the victim's mouth was 
whispered to reporters by Bush campaign operatives. There is some evidence 
that Horton may have been in the getaway car shooting heroin while his 
associates robbed and killed Fournier. A court official indicated that one of 
Horton's accomplices confessed to killing Fournier but the confession was 
disallowed because it had been secured without the reading of Miranda rights. 
Horton was convicted as an accomplice to a felony murder. In other words, there 
is no evidence that he killed Fournier and reason to believe that he did not.
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Bush next alleged that Horton had murdered again when he jumped furlough. As 
he described it in an Ohio speech in September, “You remember the case of 
Willie Horton in the Reader's Digest, the guy was furloughed, murderer, hadn't 
even served enough time for parole, goes down to Maryland, and murders again, 
and Maryland wouldn't even let him out to go back to Massachusetts, because 
they didn't want him to kill again. I don't believe in that kind of approach to 
criminals.”2 Bush's claim that Horton had committed murder while on parole 
was untrue. The Republican candidate's story, then, had three flaws: It increased
 (p.3) Horton's role in the crime for which he was originally in jail, it 
embellished the details of the crime, and it magnified the horror of Horton's 
post‐furlough activities. There is symmetry in the notion that a killer has killed 
again; thus Bush's exaggerated version of the story cohered thematically with 
the undisputed facts, and that coherence increased its plausibility. When 
Dukakis failed to challenge the Bush claims on the assumption that they were 
unbelievable, the press, taking its cue in part from the Democrat, gave Bush a 
pass. While reporters discussing the story usually correctly stated its facts, they 
did not charge Bush with deception for making the story more awful than it 
actually was.
The Bush campaign also falsely asserted that the furlough program was 
Dukakis's invention (he had inherited it from his Republican predecessor), that 
Horton was a first‐degree murderer not eligible for parole at the time of his 
furlough (he was in a category that made him eligible for parole), that there 
were hundreds of others who escaped from Massachusetts furloughs and 
committed violent crimes (none committed murder, and Horton was the only one 
who committed rape), and that Horton's name was not William but “Willie.” In 
fact, until June of 1988 Horton was referred to as William in all court documents 
and newspaper stories, including those of the Lawrence Eagle‐Tribune, the 
Massachusetts newspaper that won a Pulitzer Prize for its exposé of the furlough 
program. The advertisement featuring Horton, which was paid for by the 
National Security PAC,3 referred to him as “Willie,” and Bush, who mentioned 
him in speeches in the summer of 1988 as well as in his debate with Dukakis on 
September 25, referred to him as “Willie.” An examination of newspaper stories 
reveals that once the Bush campaign began referring to him as Willie, most 
newspapers began calling him that as well. Only the Washington Post and New 
York Times continued to call him William—although they shifted back and forth 
between the two names. Given the controversy, one would assume that reporters 
would have gone back to look at the documents surrounding the Horton case, 
including the Eagle‐Tribune series. Had they done so, they would have noticed 
that Horton hadn't been called Willie until Bush began talking about the case. 
One explanation for the lack of correction is that the name Willie sounded more 
lower class, more criminal, and indeed more “black” to reporters, and thus 
cohered with the narrative concerning Horton's crimes.
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The question of Horton's name demonstrates that the stories on which political 
arguments are built have embedded within them a variety of facts both large 
and small, any of which may be subject to distortion. The fact  (p.4) that 
reporters failed to call Bush on his claim that Horton had killed again while on 
furlough suggests the extent to which reporters, like the rest of us, often fail to 
check facts that seem compatible with compelling narratives. This is particularly 
true when the lens through which reporters are seeing is a strategic one, 
evaluating candidates' words and actions for their tactical intentions and 
electoral effects.
The Supreme Court and Election 2000
In the case of William Horton, the press permitted a compelling story—and the 
absence of clear rebuttal from Dukakis—to overwhelm the facts, allowing 
inaccuracy to pass uncorrected to the public. The denouement to the 2000 
election showed how an existing narrative can drive interpretation in cases 
where the press is called to make sense of a finite set of facts. When the tightly 
fought 2000 race came down to a disputed state decided by a margin of less 
than one one‐hundredth of one percent, the dominant narrative portrayed 
partisan division and a country equally divided between the “red states” 
supporting one candidate and the “blue states” supporting the other, as they 
were portrayed on the networks' electoral maps. Reporters had forecast two 
possible story lines about the basis for the Supreme Court decision. In the first, 
the conservative majority's disposition to minimize federal authority and reserve 
power to the states forecast a decision that would return the case to the Florida 
Supreme Court. A second story line suggested that the “conservatives” would 
find a way to hand the election to the individual most likely to strengthen their 
hold on the Court. Either of these was compatible with a 5–4 vote on the Court; 
neither was compatible with a 7–2 ruling. The ruling contained both a 7–2 
decision and a 5–4 decision. Which would reporters feature?
Democrats and Republicans were divided over whether the court had decided 7–
2 or 5–4. In fact, it had done both. “Seven justices of the court [Justices Stevens 
and Ginsburg disagreed] agree that there are constitutional problems with the 
recount ordered by the Florida Supreme court that demand a remedy,” said the 
Court. “The only disagreement [among the seven] is as to the remedy.” On the 
issue of whether there was a remedy available before a hard‐and‐fast deadline, 
two of the seven (Justices Souter and Breyer) held open the option to give it a 
try. In short, four of nine believed that there might be a remedy that would 
permit continuation of the count; five concluded that the election was over and 
for practical purposes a president elected.
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 (p.5) Republicans would argue that the recount requested by Gore had been 
unconstitutional. But that is not actually what the Court said. “Because it is 
evident that any recount seeking to meet the December 12 date will be 
unconstitutional for the reasons we have discussed,” the justices wrote, “we 
reverse the judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida ordering a recount to 
proceed” (emphasis added). One can parse the opinion into three questions: Was 
the recount to that point acceptable? Seven said no. Were the recount problems 
remediable? Seven said yes. (“It is obvious that the recount cannot be conducted 
in compliance with the requirements of equal protection and due process 
without substantial additional work.”) Were they remediable in the time 
remaining? Five said no.
If Bush v. Gore was a 7–2 ruling then the court acted decisively; if the ruling was 
5–4, the court was instead closely divided. Republicans favored the first 
construction; Democrats the second. Just before midnight December 12, the 
Gore campaign issued a statement saying that Gore and Lieberman were 
“reviewing the 5–4 decision issued tonight by the Supreme Court of the United 
States . . . ” The next evening he seemed to lay fights over the size of the 
majority behind the ruling to rest with the words “The U.S. Supreme Court has 
spoken. Let there be no doubt. While I strongly disagree with the court's 
decision, I accept it. I accept the finality of this outcome.” The Bush camp, on 
the other hand, characterized the ruling differently. James Baker, appearing 
before Gore's concession, said that the Texas governor was “very pleased and 
gratified that seven justices of the United States Supreme Court agreed that 
there were constitutional problems with the recount ordered by the Florida 
Supreme Court.”4
More than six months after the Supreme Court ruling, the person who led the 
Bush team in the thirty‐six days was still working to cast the decision as a 7–2 
vote. In a letter to the editor of the New York Times, James Baker protested the 
fact that “you have once again described Bush v. Gore as a 5‐to‐4 decision . . . a 
point that is accurate but also incomplete . . . The court's holding that the lack of 
uniform standards for the recount violated the 14th Amendment guarantee of 
equal protection was decided on a 7‐to‐2 vote, with one of two Democrats joining 
six of seven Republicans.”5 The statement by Baker says more than he may have 
intended. Presumably in their role as justices of the Supreme Court, individuals 
do not consider themselves members of a party, although one could 
appropriately characterize them as nominated by presidents who were either 
Republicans or Democrats. In his eagerness to establish that the important 
decision was rendered 7–2, Baker reopened a far more damaging charge—that 
the justices acted politically.
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 (p.6) Overwhelmingly, press accounts focused on the 5–4 ruling. The New York 
Times headline read: “Bush Prevails; By Single Vote, Justices End Recount.” 
“The Supreme Court effectively handed the presidential election to George W. 
Bush tonight,” wrote Linda Greenhouse, “overturning the Florida Supreme 
Court and ruling by a vote of 5 to 4 that there could be no further counting of 
Florida's disputed presidential votes.” “Supreme Court Rules for Bush,” read the 
headline in the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, “5–4 Decision Clears Path to the 
Presidency.” “A deeply divided U.S. Supreme Court on Tuesday night effectively 
handed the presidential election to Texas Governor George W. Bush,” said the 
first sentence. “A sharply divided U.S. Supreme Court last night handed Texas 
governor George W. Bush what may be a presidential victory,” wrote the
Cleveland Plain Dealer. In the San Diego Union‐Tribune the headline announced 
“5–4 Ruling Puts Bush on Threshold of Victory.” The Court was “sharply split,” 
said the accompanying article.
Although reporters might have spent more time discussing the elements of the 
Supreme Court's ruling with which seven members agreed, the 5–4 split—
conservatives on one side, liberals on the other—fit so well with the larger story 
line of a divided country and a neck‐and‐neck election that it almost inevitably 
became the central point in describing the Court's decision. This is not to say 
there was anything inaccurate about that characterization; on many of the key 
issues of substance, the Court was indeed divided 5–4. But this provides another 
example of the way frames highlight some facts and interpretations instead of 
others.
The decision by the Gore team to concede the day after the Supreme Court 
ruling was, in part, a reflection of its reaction to the way the media had played 
the story. The staff writers for the Washington Post note:
Could they fight on? Sure, Boies said. Should they? “It is not just making a 
decision of whether this is viable or sensible,” he said later. “It is whether 
the viability of it or the sensibility of it [is] great enough to consider it. It is 
not just a legal question.” It was a question about a divided country, and 
about the future of Al Gore.
All this was hashed and rehashed in early morning conference calls. At 
about 8:30, Daley and Gore spoke again. “The spin on the morning news 
was ‘It's over,’ ” Daley noted. Even if they wanted to keep fighting, there 
was scant running room and vanishing support.6
The Press as Storyteller
Page 7 of 24
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All 
Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a 
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).
A process that had begun when the vice president believed the media reports 
and called to concede ended when the vice president heard from an aide that the 
news interpretation precluded any further legal  (p.7) challenge. The frame 
through which the Supreme Court decision was discussed provided a coda to the 
contested 2000 election. The reliance on the 5–4 frame opened a story line 
suggesting that a single Supreme Court justice had in fact selected the president 
of the United States. As we will argue later, when the so‐called media recounts 
were complete, the press itself dismissed that story line.
Who Had Political Relations With That Company?
When an assumption is widely shared within the press, an allegation consistent 
with the assumption is more likely than it otherwise would be to travel 
uncorrected into news. The campaign finance scandals of the Clinton 
administration were telegraphed in one often repeated claim: those who gave 
money were invited to spend the night in the Lincoln Bedroom.
The Lincoln Bedroom first emerged as a symbol of selling access when it was 
revealed that the Clinton administration had rewarded large contributors by 
allowing them to spend a night in the White House, some in the Lincoln 
Bedroom. The story became a powerful symbol because it told of wealthy 
contributors in effect being able to purchase the right to temporarily occupy 
what is in the American civil religion a kind of sacred space by virtue of its 
association with a revered president. The proximity of the Lincoln Bedroom to 
both the Oval Office and the President's bedroom translates readily into a 
symbol of intimate access and proximity to power.
As the Enron scandal developed at the beginning of 2002, one of the key points 
of contention was, first, whether it was a business scandal or a political one, 
and, second, if it was a political scandal, who was implicated in it. Democrats 
argued that Enron in general and its chairman, Kenneth Lay, in particular were 
much closer to the GOP than to them. Observing that three quarters of Enron's 
contributions went to Republicans, Democratic consultant James Carville said to 
Tim Russert on Meet the Press on February 17, 2002, “This ludicrous idea, ‘Oh, 
they both got it,’ no, it was 73 to 27. If you lose the game 73 to 27, that is not a 
tie.” Republicans attempted to tell the story as one in which Enron spread its 
wealth to both parties. Supporting that view was a claim repeated in numerous 
media outlets: Ken Lay had spent a night in the Lincoln Bedroom during the 
Clinton administration. The Lincoln Bedroom story turned out to be false; 
although Lay had played golf with President  (p.8) Clinton, he had spent the 
night in the White House only at the invitation of George H. W. Bush.
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Because it was known that Clinton had rewarded contributors with nights in the 
Lincoln Bedroom, and it was also known that Ken Lay had given large amounts 
of money to many politicians, it was plausible that Ken Lay had rested in 
Lincoln's bed at Clinton's invitation. The claim originated on the Drudge Report, 
and was then picked up by the Chicago Tribune and USA Today. Subsequently, it 
appeared in, among other places, a news story in the Washington Times; 
editorials in the Cleveland Plain Dealer, Portland Oregonian, and Augusta 
Chronicle; and in a Newhouse News Service column by James Lileks distributed 
to multiple newspapers. It reached overseas, appearing in the Times of London, 
the Sunday Age of Melbourne, and the Korea Herald. Fred Barnes wrote it in the
Weekly Standard and made the claim on Fox News's Special Report with Brit 
Hume. On the same network, Republican activist David Bossie said the same 
thing on Greta Van Susteren's On the Record. Republican media consultant Alex 
Castellanos made the claim on CNN's Crossfire on February 14, then again on 
ABC's This Week on February 17. That appearance was the only time anyone 
directly challenged the assertion. The exchange on This Week offers a good 
example of the way in which such claims survive untethered to fact.
Castellanos: Paul forgot—Paul forgot to mention that Ken Lay slept in the 
Lincoln Bedroom in the Clinton administration, not Bush.
Begala: No, that's not true, actually.
Castellanos: But anyway—yes, it is.
Begala: That's false. It's false.
Castellanos: But anyway . . .
Begala: Maybe Bush One, but no, not Clinton.
Castellanos: Anyway, what the Democrats are doing here . . .
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Moderator George Stephanopoulos probably did not attempt to settle the factual 
dispute because he did not know whether the story was true or not. Instead, 
after Castellanos and Begala went back and forth, Stephanapoulos said, “Alex, 
let me talk a little bit more about the Republican strategy . . . ” Had 
Stephanopoulos stepped in to side with Begala, he would have been accurate, 
but might have risked the perception that his past work as a Clinton aide was 
compromising his role as a moderator. Would audiences have believed a former 
Clinton aide turned journalist in this kind of factual dispute? Ultimately the Lay‐
in‐the‐Lincoln‐Bedroom story was debunked by Gene Lyons of the Arkansas 
Democrat‐Gazette and  (p.9) Brendan Nyhan in the on‐line magazine Salon, but 
the correction did not diffuse into the national media. Mistaken information 
given plausibility by the past actions of Clinton and Lay and by its coherence 
with an existing narrative was thus able to help Republicans widen the sphere of 
responsibility for Enron to include Democrats. With each subsequent retelling, 
the story became less and less likely to be checked for accuracy. When a 
contested piece of information such as this arises, reporters have a 
responsibility to discover the truth, then sanction anyone who repeats a 
falsehood.
Tobacco, Taxes, and Canadian Mounties
When two sides are projecting competing outcomes from a piece of legislation, 
reports are likely to simply set their claims against each other and probe for 
tactical advantage. If the facts are checked, reporters are more likely to 
scrutinize the claims of those who have demonstrated a capacity to deceive the 
public in the past. If the contest is between the tobacco companies on one hand 
and groups such as the American Cancer Society and the Campaign for Tobacco‐
Free Kids on the other, the fact that internal documents had confirmed that the 
tobacco industry had lied about marketing to kids meant that the media were 
more likely to explore the accuracy of its arguments than those of the other side.
There was not a week in a three‐and‐a‐half‐month period in 1998 in which 
tobacco industry ads addressing an antitobacco bill sponsored by John McCain 
were not being aired. The McCain bill would have settled the states' suits 
against the tobacco industry by providing protection for the industry from class‐
action lawsuits in return for an increased tobacco tax and assurances that the 
industry would no longer advertise to the young through billboards near schools 
and the like. The industry's ad campaign was significant in part because it was 
the first time a large‐scale, long‐running nationwide broadcast ad campaign on a 
piece of pending legislation had run with negligible response from those on the 
other side. The only television ad by proponents of a “tough bill” against “Big 
Tobacco” was aired by the American Cancer Society for a single week in May in 
five states and nationally on CNN. By contrast, the tobacco industry's ads aired 
widely (in from thirty to fifty markets) on both cable and local spot broadcast. 
Much of the industry budget was spent on CNN, which did not air a single news 
piece evaluating the accuracy of the ads' claims.
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 (p.10) One of the industry ads featured Ron Martelle, identified as a former 
Canadian Mountie, who said, “The criminals that showed up in Cornwall 
threatened my life and the lives of my family. All because a tax that was 
supposed to protect our teenagers from smoking ended up hurting all of us, and 
as a result, teens purchased black market cigarettes.”
Illustrating the role the press should play in providing context for facts offered 
by those engaged in political debate, New York Times reporter Anthony DePalma 
noted that “many of the 47,000 people who live in Cornwall say Mr. Martelle is 
exaggerating, just as, in their view, he had tended to blow things out of 
proportion during the more than five years he was mayor.” The same article 
reported the attack of his opponents: “They point out that although he calls 
himself a former Mountie, he was in the force for only eight months . . . They 
also delight in pointing out that the company Mr. Martelle now works for, 
Forensic Investigative Associates of Toronto, represents the National Coalition 
Against Crime and Tobacco Contraband, a lobbying group for tobacco 
wholesalers, retailers and the major cigarette producers in the United States.”7
What else should reporters have told viewers? The tobacco industry ads implied 
a legitimacy that their claims lacked by providing on‐screen citations to 
supposed forms of documentation. A number of the ads argued that the McCain 
bill would “create 17 new government bureaucracies . . . Washington wants to 
raise the price of cigarettes so high, there would be a black market in cigarettes 
with unregulated access to kids.”
By any reasonable definition of “bureaucracy,” this claim was false. The ads for 
the five tobacco companies source the “seventeen new government 
bureaucracies” assertion to an April 9, 1998 research note by David Adelman of 
Morgan Stanley. However, Adelman's “Industry Overview” was not an 
independent finding that there would be seventeen new government 
bureaucracies. Instead Adelman was quoting tobacco company CEO Steve 
Goldstone's April 8 speech at the National Press Club. And Goldstone did not use 
the word bureaucracies but “17 separate tobacco committees and boards.” 
Adelman's document also contained the following information: “Within the last 
three years, Morgan Stanley and Co. Inc., Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. and/or their 
affiliates managed or comanaged a public offering of the securities of RJR 
Nabisco.”
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The statement “Lots of money for new government bureaucracy” is sourced to 
an article in the Washington Post. However, there is no backup for the assertion 
in the cited article. Instead it said, “President Clinton's new budget calls for 
spending nearly $10 billion from the proposed national tobacco settlement on a 
wide variety of new initiatives . . . ”8 The  (p.11) cited article referred not to the 
McCain bill but to a request in President Clinton's budget. On‐screen citations 
for information, which have become commonplace in both candidate and 
advocacy ads in recent years, are a welcome development. As this case 
illustrates, the fact that someone offers citations does not mean that they are 
necessarily telling the truth.
And what of Martelle's claim that teens simply got their cigarettes on the black 
market created by the tax increase? In a May 19 adwatch on ABC, Aaron Brown 
evaluated both the industry ad claim that the McCain bill would produce a black 
market and the implication that kids would buy cigarettes there:
Narrator in ad: There will be a black market in cigarettes with 
unregulated access to kids.
Brown: The industry cites Canada as proof. In the early '80s when Canada 
increased cigarette prices, a black market did emerge. But something else 
happened in Canada the tobacco industry doesn't mention.
David Sweanor: Non‐Smokers Rights Canada: The price went up in 
Canada, consumption among teenagers plummeted.
Brown: The number of kids who smoked every day dropped by 60% in 
little more than a decade. The tobacco companies know this. The evidence 
of their knowledge is contained in their own files. This Philip Morris 
strategic planning document from the early '90s states it simply.
Voice‐over reading from Philip Morris document: “There is no 
question that increasing taxes will cause a decrease in smoking. This point 
is best illustrated by the present situation in Canada.” Five years earlier, a 
Philip Morris analysis of price increases concluded, “Price increases 
prevented 600,000 teenagers from starting to smoke. We don't need to 
have that happen again.”
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As in the case of Brown's report, the press is more likely to deconstruct and 
critique the narrative provided by those it perceives to be powerful and 
manipulative. But one other element was missing from the context reporters 
should have offered: when Canada increased its taxes on cigarettes, the source 
for a black market—that is, a place where black marketeers could purchase 
cigarettes Canadians wanted to buy—was just over the border in the United 
States. With cigarettes in Canada subject to high taxes, would similar taxes in 
the United States give rise to a huge black market for Mexican cigarettes? From 
where would the black market come?
Why should we be concerned about the small amount of fact‐checking of these 
ads? Survey data show that the deceptive claims of the ads were believed in 
markets with high airing, little adwatching, and little  (p.12) rebuttal.9 So the 
deception succeeded. Anthony DePalma's New York Times piece and Aaron 
Brown's adwatch are examples of journalists upholding their responsibility as 
custodians of fact, evaluating claims, and investigating to determine accuracy. 
Unfortunately, many more people saw the tobacco industry's inaccurate 
advertising than saw these isolated corrections.
When one side in a policy debate makes a prediction about the effects of 
legislation, reporters have a responsibility to make judgments about the 
likelihood that those consequences will actually occur. This is particularly true of 
those opposed to a legislative change, who usually predict a dire outcome should 
a proposed bill become law. These campaigns conduct survey and focus group 
research to determine the arguments against the legislation that resonate most 
strongly with the citizenry; sometimes these arguments are reasonable and 
sometimes they are not. For instance, when automobile manufacturers and 
business groups argue against proposals to increase fuel efficiency standards for 
cars, they contend that higher fuel efficiency would result in lower safety, 
because when a small car collides with a large sport utility vehicle, the people in 
the small care are more likely to be killed; more small cars would equal more 
people being crushed by SUVs. Indeed some ads have shown an SUV at the point 
of impact with a small car. But if higher fuel efficiency meant smaller cars, the 
same logic would dictate higher safety, since fewer SUVs would be on the road 
to crush those in small cars. The questionable logic of the argument presented in 
the advertisements is seldom pointed out by journalists.
Although predicting the effects of legislation can require a measure of 
speculation, reporters can evaluate the factual and logical basis of forecasts 
without making categorical predictions about the future. Often, reporters avoid 
such evaluations because of the risk of seeming biased should they determine 
that one side is being less than accurate. But when the press fails to critically 
examine these predictions, it makes it difficult for the public to assess the case 
for and against proposed change.
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The Press as Patriot: Four War Stories
On August 3, 1964, President Lyndon Johnson ordered the Navy to take 
retaliatory action in the Gulf of Tonkin after, he stated, the U.S. destroyer
Maddox had been attacked by communist PT boats. The next day, in a nationally 
televised speech, Johnson defined the enemy action in the  (p.13) Tonkin Gulf as 
“open aggression on the high seas against the United States of America.” He 
asked Congress to pass “a resolution making it clear that our government is 
united in its determination to take all necessary measures in support of freedom 
and in defense of peace in south‐east Asia.”10 On August 10, Congress passed 
the Tonkin Gulf Resolution.
The narrative that initiated the United States's formal entry into the war in 
Vietnam was simple in its construction. The United States had been attacked. 
The attack constituted aggression on the high seas. The United States 
responded at once on the order Johnson gave “after the initial act of 
aggression.” The response of the military was heroic “in the highest tradition of 
the U.S. Navy.” The U.S. response was “limited and fitting.” The cause was just; 
the goal, peace. “Firmness in the right is indispensable today for peace,” said 
Johnson.
There was only one problem with the narrative. The U.S. destroyer Maddox had, 
in all likelihood, not been attacked. In 1995, Johnson's defense secretary, Robert 
McNamara, said that he was convinced the attack that prompted the U.S. 
retaliation had never actually occurred. As was later revealed in his secretly 
recorded audiotapes, President Johnson himself doubted whether the attack took 
place.11 McNamara also said that had it not been for the Tonkin Gulf incident, 
the war resolution (which had been drafted months before) would have been 
sent to Congress later and would have been subject to a more extensive 
debate.12
The Tonkin Gulf case illustrates a number of important features of political 
discourse. First, what we believe is in part a function of what we are told by 
those entrusted with information we lack. Congress believed Johnson at a time 
when skepticism would have better served the country's interests. In turn, the 
country believed Johnson, for it had little reason to expect that a president 
would lie about such a consequential matter. Second, this example shows that 
facts matter. Policies are built on arguments describing the past, present, and 
future; if those arguments contain untruth, the consequences can be enormous. 
Third, it demonstrates that the impulse to bend the truth in order to maintain 
support for one's goals is a powerful one.
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This is not to say that politicians persuade mostly by lying. Instead, they tell the 
public stories, selecting facts and arguments that support their interpretation of 
reality. In the context of events occurring in war zones overseas, the press is 
constrained by its often limited ability to confirm the factual assertions made by 
the government. As the next example shows, in times of crisis the press often 
refrains from punishing the government for deception, even when it learns the 
truth.
 (p.14) Deception Excused: Air Force One
After word of the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon reached 
President George W. Bush's staff at a school in Florida where Bush was making 
an appearance, Air Force One flew the president from Miami to a military base 
in Louisiana and from there to the Strategic Air Command headquarters in 
Nebraska before returning to Washington. Members of the press wondered why 
he had done this. Hoping to blunt a narrative in which Bush appeared to be the 
object of forces beyond his control rather than a decisive leader guiding the 
country through the crisis, Bush aides told reporters that there had been a 
“credible threat” against Air Force One. If that was true, then the moves across 
the country were the reasonable response of a vigilant Secret Service and a 
national security process to protect the commander in chief. If it was not true, 
then the Bush aides were deceiving reporters to create a false image of a 
President's behavior. “Credible evidence” that Air Force One was at risk was 
quickly disseminated. Bush adviser Karl Rove told journalists that the Secret 
Service had received a telephoned threat that “contained language that was 
evidence that the terrorists had knowledge of his procedures and whereabouts. 
In light of the specific and credible threat, it was decided to get airborne with a 
fighter escort.”13
Reporters later learned that Rove and administration spokesperson Ari Fleischer 
had misled them. Administration officials had no record of any such call, and 
were unable to explain why Air Force One was less vulnerable in one location 
than another even if there had been such a message.14 Had such an act occurred 
in a political campaign, headlines would have reported the deception. Instead, 
the facts were largely buried. The country needed to believe in a decisive, 
commanding president in the anxious days after September 11, and the press 
was not disposed to feature evidence incompatible with that narrative.
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People generally assume that the press plays an adversarial role to those in 
power and is quick to unmask, debunk, and challenge. In fact, reporters play this 
role selectively. If they assume that the country supports the person telling the 
story (in this case the president) and opposing narratives are not being offered 
by competing players, the tendency to challenge is dramatically curtailed. At the 
time of the Tonkin Gulf speech, Johnson was on his way to a landslide victory 
against Barry Goldwater. After assuming the presidency at the death of John 
Kennedy, LBJ had driven much of the Kennedy legislative agenda through 
Congress. His was a formidable presence. At the same time, the Tonkin Gulf  (p.
15) Resolution was passed overwhelmingly by Democrats as well as
Republicans. Only two dissenters opposed the Resolution. Faced with the
allegation of an attack on the country and two parties united behind the
president, reporters are disinclined to buck the tide.
Reporters sometimes say that their job is to tell the public “what it needs to 
know.” The perceived need can shift depending on how the public feels. In a time 
of crisis, do citizens “need” to know if the president's representatives have 
misled them? As these cases indicate, in times of national crisis, when reporters 
learn that they have been deceived they downplay the implications. Implying 
that Bush was not up to the job that first day seemed unpatriotic.
While campaigns and policy debates are characterized by competing narratives, 
in wartime the country is often presented with a single, uncontested story line. 
In both cases, the successful construction and use of narrative often determines 
the outcome of events. We illustrate this claim with a particularly gruesome tale 
from the Gulf War.
Did Saddam's Soldiers Throw Babies from Their Incubators in Kuwait?
With hundreds of thousands of soldiers massing in the Persian Gulf in the fall of 
1990, America was on the brink of an undeclared war against Iraq over its 
invasion of Kuwait. The Bush administration needed not only to provide a 
principled justification for action, but to demonize Saddam Hussein and those 
who served him. To that end, Bush focused attention on a compelling narrative—
albeit one built on a fabrication.
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On October 10, 1990, a fifteen‐year‐old using the assumed name “Nayirah” 
appeared before the Congressional Human Rights Caucus. “I just came out of 
Kuwait,” she said. “While I was there, I saw the Iraqi soldiers come into the 
hospital with guns. They took the babies out of the incubators, took the 
incubators and left the children to die on the cold floor. It was horrifying. I could 
not help but think of my nephew, who was born premature and might have died 
that day as well.” At the end of her testimony, Congressman John Porter said, 
“We've passed eight years in the existence of the Congressional Human Rights 
Caucus. We've had scores of hearings about human rights abuses throughout the 
world . . . we have never heard, in all this time, in all circumstances, a record of 
inhumanity and brutality and sadism as the ones that the witnesses have given 
us today. I don't know how the people of the civilized countries of  (p.16) this 
world can fail to do everything within their power to remove this scourge from 
the face of our earth . . . [A]ll the countries of the world . . . must join together 
and take whatever action may be necessary to free the people of Kuwait.” The 
audience for the account included the president, who told Porter that “he had 
seen it on CNN and that he was shocked at some of the things that he had 
heard.”15
It is unclear why President Bush should have been shocked, since the day before 
Nayirah's testimony, identifying the Emir of Kuwait as the source, he had alluded 
to babies taken from incubators. In that first telling, however, he added that the 
stories may not have been authenticated. Specifically, at a press conference 
October 9, he said “babies in incubators [were] heaved out of the incubators and 
the incubators themselves sent to Baghdad. Now I don't know how many of 
these tales can be authenticated but I do know that when the Emir was here he 
was speaking from the heart.” “Speaking from the heart” uses perceived 
sincerity as a test of reliability. This is one unusual instance in which the elder 
Bush used a technique similar to one employed often by his son, using good 
intentions—the contents of the Emir's heart—as a counter‐weight to potential 
criticism or factual refutation.
There was at the time another source that confirmed the incubator story. After 
the young woman testified, her observations were corroborated by Amnesty 
International, which concluded that 312 infants had died after Iraqi soldiers 
removed them from their incubators.
After the first reference, in which Bush qualified the story by expressing 
uncertainty about its authenticity, the incident moved from an undocumented 
tale to a statement of presumed fact. Rallying troops en route to Iraq on October 
28, Bush said that twenty‐two babies had died and “the hospital employees were 
shot and the plundered machines were shipped off to Baghdad.”
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The story then became a staple of the Bush drive to mobilize public support for 
the impending war. In a speech in Mashpee, Massachusetts on November 1, 
Bush said of Saddam Hussein and his forces, “They've tried to silence Kuwaiti 
dissent and courage with firing squads, much as Hitler did when he invaded 
Poland. They have committed outrageous acts of barbarism. In one hospital, they 
pulled twenty‐two premature babies from their incubators, sent the machines 
back to Baghdad, and all those little ones died.” Speaking to the allied forces 
near Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, Bush said on November 22, “It turns your stomach 
when you listen to the tales of those that have escaped the brutality of Saddam, 
the invader. Mass hangings. Babies pulled from their incubators and scattered 
like firewood across the floor.”
 (p.17) The story served two purposes: legitimizing the analogy between Hitler 
and Hussein, and rebutting the charge that the conflict was actually about 
retaining U.S. access to Middle East oil. The analogy to Hitler set justification for 
the war not on the pragmatic claim that the United States needed access to the 
region's oil but on the moral claim that Saddam's acts were an affront to 
humanity. So, for example, on October 28 at a rally in Manchester, New 
Hampshire, Bush said, “I read the other night about how Hitler, unchallenged—
the U.S. locked in its isolation in those days, the late thirties—marched into 
Poland. Behind him . . . came the Death's Head regiments of the SS. Their role 
was to go in and disassemble the country. Just as it happened in the past, the 
other day in Kuwait, two young kids were passing out leaflets in opposition. They 
were taken, their families made to watch, and they were shot to death—a fifteen‐ 
and sixteen‐year‐old. Other people on dialysis machines taken off the machines 
and the machines shipped to Baghdad. Kids in incubators thrown out so that the 
machinery, the incubators themselves, could be shipped to Baghdad.” On 
October 15, Bush closed his litany of atrocities by saying “Hitler revisited.” It 
was only when Bush attempted to argue that Hussein was not simply the 
German dictator's equal but worse than Hitler that the analogy was criticized.16
The use of the story of the babies to dismiss the pragmatic claim and justify the 
moral one—making the war about human rights, not oil—was clear on October 
23 when Bush told a fund‐raiser in Burlington, Vermont, “They had kids in 
incubators, and they were thrown out of the incubators so that Kuwait could be 
systematically dismantled. So, it isn't oil that we're concerned about. It is 
aggression. And this aggression is not going to stand.” Speaking to the troops at 
Pearl Harbor on October 28, Bush said, “What we are looking at is good and evil, 
right and wrong. And day after day, shocking new horrors reveal the true nature 
of terror in Kuwait.” In his list of horrors was the story of the incubators.
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On Larry King Live on October 16, Kuwait's ambassador to the United States, 
Sheik Saud Nasir al‐Sabah, cited the young woman's testimony and the Amnesty 
International report as proof of atrocities in Kuwait. Eyewitnesses, he said, 
“came out and described all the brutalities of the Iraqis against my people . . . 
and they are also being corroborated by Amnesty International.” Unnoted during 
any of this was the fact uncovered by Harper's publisher John R. MacArthur long 
after the war was over: “Nayirah” was the Kuwaiti ambassador's daughter and a 
member of the royal family of Kuwait.17 After its own investigations concluded 
that no babies had been removed from incubators, Amnesty International 
retracted its report.
 (p.18) On March 15, 1991, not long after the fighting had ended, ABC reporter 
John Martin revealed that the incubator story was a fiction when he interviewed 
employees at the hospital where the incident allegedly took place. In a 60 
Minutes exposé in January 1992, Morley Safer talked with Andrew Whitley, 
executive director of Middle East Watch, who reported that a colleague went to 
the Adon Hospital after the liberation of Kuwait “and interviewed the doctors, 
and he was able to speak to people who said they had been on duty at that time, 
and that this incident didn't happen.” Asked by Safer to explain, a representative 
of Hill & Knowlton, the powerhouse Washington lobbying and public relations 
firm that choreographed the campaign, said, “I'm sure there will always be two 
sides to a story. I believe Nayirah. I have no reason not to believe her. The 
veracity of her story was indelibly marked on my mind when I saw her and when 
I talked to her.”18 In this telling, truth is relative and the perceived authenticity 
of the speaker is the test of veracity. But there either were or were not Iraqi 
soldiers in the hospital in Kuwait. If there were, they either did or did not 
remove babies from incubators and put them on the floor; they either did or did 
not kill hospital personnel; they either did or did not then ship the empty 
incubators to Baghdad; the babies either did or did not die. President Bush 
either did or did not have a warranted reason for outrage.
While the Gulf War may have been justified on any number of grounds, the 
incubator story was offered repeatedly by the war's proponents as primary 
evidence of the moral righteousness of the cause. In the Senate, where a 
resolution supporting the use of force was passed by five votes, the incubator 
story was cited six times during debate on the resolution. The incident was 
mentioned in floor debates about the war a total of twenty‐two times.
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In the President's rhetoric the synoptic statement justifying the war—“This 
aggression is not going to stand”—was built in part on a deception about babies 
and incubators. More important for our purposes here, the narrative was used to 
rebut the charge that the purpose of going to war was securing access to oil, as 
opponents of the war alleged (“No blood for oil” was the chant heard at protests 
of the war). Bush used the dramatic, heartrending story to reframe the conflict 
as a moral one in which no compromise was possible and the United States's 
actions, in the past or present, would not be subject to debate given the evil of 
the enemy.
The Nayirah tale is instructive for other reasons that speak to our need for 
public wariness and press vigilance when public discourse veers into emotional 
anecdote. MacArthur's book and Safer's exposé both  (p.19) appeared in 1992, 
nearly a year after the war was over; the ABC News story was the first attempt 
to disprove the incubator story, but it appeared after the war ended as well. The 
incubator story raises a number of important questions: First, was the president 
deceived? What efforts were made to verify the facts used to justify 
consequential action? Did the president believe the account because he heard it 
from the Emir, saw Nayirah's testimony on CNN, and read Amnesty 
International's seeming corroboration? Was the analogy comparing Saddam 
Hussein to Adolf Hitler—which was made from the day Iraq invaded Kuwait—
given more legitimacy by the incubator story? These questions are important 
because 200,000 troops were already on the ground when the incubator story 
emerged.
Why did it take so long for reporters to check the facts? Of course, journalists 
would have had trouble getting into Kuwait to talk with the medical personnel in 
the hospital. Nonetheless, why was there no skepticism about a story from a 
young woman speaking under an assumed name? Why no tests of her 
credibility? Didn't any reporter in Washington know enough about the family of 
the ambassador to recognize his daughter? Why didn't any reporter ask for a 
copy of her passport to verify that she was in Kuwait at the reported time? John 
MacArthur reported that Congressman Tom Lantos, the cochair of the Human 
Rights Caucus, knew before the hearing that “Nayirah” was in fact the 
ambassador's daughter. Although Congressman Porter denies knowing, the 
Kuwaiti ambassador himself claimed that both congressmen were aware of her 
identity. Why did no reporters ask Lantos or Porter if they had any information 
that would substantiate her claims?
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Why didn't someone test the claim of Amnesty International by asking U.S. 
doctors who had visited Kuwait how many incubators a single hospital would be 
expected to have in use at a given time? Does Kuwait have an unusually large 
number of premature births? Why didn't reporters spot the contradictions in 
Bush's accounts? For example, in a speech in Des Moines on October 16, Bush 
said, “In a hospital Iraqi soldiers unplugged the oxygen to incubators supporting 
twenty‐two premature babies. They all died. And then they shot the hospital 
employees.”Did the soldiers unplug the oxygen or throw the babies to the 
ground? The story changed in various tellings. As C. Wright Mills observed in
The Sociological Imagination, “The problem of empirical verification is ‘how to 
get down to the facts’ . . . The problem is first what to verify and second how to 
verify it.”19
The reporter who uncovered Nayirah's identity did so while writing a book about 
propaganda and the Gulf War. John R. MacArthur told  (p.20) 60 Minutes, “I set 
out to find out, like any reporter does. And I started asking questions. And I 
finally heard a rumor that Nayirah was the daughter of the Kuwaiti ambassador, 
so I used an old reporter's trick. I called up the embassy, and I said, ‘Nayirah did 
a terrific job at the Human Rights Caucus, and I think her father must be very 
proud of her. And doesn't she deserve her place in history?’ And the 
ambassador's secretary said to me, ‘You're not supposed to know that. No one's 
supposed to know she's the ambassador's daughter.’ ”
The conditions of war made the press both more willing to accept the incubator 
story and less able to determine whether it was true. But in other cases, 
assertions that would have been quite simple to investigate have been accepted 
at face value because they cohered to form a powerful, coherent narrative.
Did the Patriots Intercept and Destroy the Scuds?
As Congress and the president once again debate the feasibility of deploying a 
missile defense shield, the ability of what Dwight Eisenhower called the “military 
industrial complex” to produce technology that shoots down incoming weapons 
should be open to question. We all remember watching the Patriot missiles 
blasting Scuds out of the sky, rendering Saddam Hussein's malevolence impotent 
in the face of our technological prowess. During the Gulf War, we were told that 
the Patriots worked nearly perfectly.
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The rhetoric at the time reduced the Scuds vs. the Patriots to a tale of U.S. 
superiority, a rebuke to those who had doubted the Patriot. On February 15, 
1991, President Bush visited the Raytheon plant that constructed the Patriot 
missiles. “The critics said that this system was plagued with problems, that 
results from the test range wouldn't stand up under battlefield conditions,” he 
told the workers. “You knew they were wrong, those critics, all along. And now 
the world knows it too. Beginning with the first Scud launched in Saudi Arabia, 
right into Saudi Arabia and the Patriot that struck it down and with the arrival of 
Patriot battalions in Israel, all told, Patriot is 41 for 42: 42 Scuds engaged, 41 
intercepted . . . Not every intercept results in total destruction. But Patriot is 
proof positive that missile defense works. I've said many times that missile 
defense threatens no one, that there is no purer defensive weapon than one that 
targets and destroys missiles launched against us. Thank God for the  (p.21) 
Patriot missile.” Note that the President is actually claiming interception, not 
destruction. Hence the qualification “not every intercept results in total 
destruction.” But what the audience is supposed to hear is clear in the sentences 
that follow: The Patriot worked. Did it?
Later evidence indicated that the answer was no. Testifying before a 
congressional hearing in 1992, Secretary of Defense William J. Perry said that “I 
believe that the Patriot cannot deal with countermeasures,”20 meaning that it 
could be easily fooled into missing its targets. The General Accounting Office 
indicated in 1994 that “the Patriot's success rate may have been no better than 9 
percent: four Scuds downed or disabled out of 44 targeted.”21 When a 1992 
congressional hearing produced a report critical of the Patriot's performance in 
the Gulf War, Raytheon lobbied successfully to prevent the report from being 
approved. The unapproved draft included the statement that “the public and the 
Congress were misled by definitive statements of success issued by 
administration and Raytheon representatives during and after the war.”22
The Pentagon's impulse to overstate the success of missile defense systems 
emerged again in 2001. On July 14, the system successfully intercepted a missile 
in a test conducted over the Pacific. “Bush's Hopes for Missile System Get Boost 
With Successful Test,” said the Wall Street Journal. “Interceptor Scores a Direct 
Hit on Missile; Successful Test a Boost to Bush's Shield Plan,” said the
Washington Post. But ten days later, an article in the magazine Defense Week
revealed that the test had been rigged—the missile was outfitted with a homing 
beacon that guided the interceptor toward it (and away from the “decoy” the 
system was supposed to avoid).23 The revelation that the test had been rigged 
was the subject of few stories in major newspapers, all of which were buried on 
inside pages. Once again, the story of technological success was trumpeted 
prominently, while the subsequent correction, revealing that the performance 
was not quite as advertised, would have been noticed by far fewer people.
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In sum, the stories we tell and that are told matter as do the stories that are 
never spun. Skillfully deployed stories are important because they persuade. A 
young woman tells a harrowing tale of murdered babies, and the story becomes 
an exhibit in rallying a nation to war. Past fact can bear directly on present‐day 
decisions, as well. If, as generals and the President told us, the Patriot missiles 
reliably destroyed Scuds, then that fact might bolster our confidence that their 
manufacturer might produce a workable missile defense shield. But if the 
missiles were easily confused by countermeasures, just as the missiles in the 
missile defense  (p.22) shield appear now to be, we might be more skeptical 
about claims that a workable technology is in the offing.
What these examples and the others we have cited have in common is that those 
who utilized them were able to present a dramatic narrative that played an 
outsized role in the debate of the moment, driving out relevant facts. As 
psychologists have known for many years, people don't evaluate situations and 
make decisions by conducting an inventory of all the information to which they 
have been exposed about a subject. Instead, both the press and the public use 
heuristics, often referred to as “information shortcuts,” to make evaluation 
easier. One of the most commonly employed is the availability heuristic; we rely 
on what is most easily available in our memories. Because evocative images are 
more available in memory, they carry a greater importance in evaluations.24
Dramatic, repeated, visually evocative materials can be tools of terror or 
vehicles that reassure. By repeatedly showing the hijacked planes hitting the 
World Trade Center towers, news increased our sense that such attacks were 
likely to occur. By repeatedly showing the towers collapsing, news magnified our 
fear that we would be trapped in a tall building as it collapsed. By repeatedly 
airing stories about anthrax, news increased the likelihood that we would be 
fearful as we opened our mail.
The dramatic narrative can thus drive out relevant facts. Ordinary Americans, 
the vast majority of whom would not be targets of an attack, feared opening 
their mail because of the stories of the few letters that contained anthrax, 
despite the billions of letters delivered spore‐free. In 1991, Americans 
remembered the incubator and the success of the Patriot missile, understanding 
the war as a battle against evil in which victory was obtained in large part 
through the triumph of American technology. When voters in 1988 evaluated 
Michael Dukakis's crime record, the fact that the furlough program was begun 
by his Republican predecessor and that serious crime was down in 
Massachusetts were forgotten by most (although he mentioned them often), 
while the dramatic story of “Willie” Horton was remembered. In a contest 
between data and dramatic narrative, the narrative is likely to be stored and 
recalled.
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The political narratives on which we have focused underscore the insight 
underlying Aristotle's observation that pity and fear are powerful drivers of 
stories, and Kenneth Burke's realization that identification is at the core of the 
powerful rhetoric. We respond by identifying with Nayirah and with the babies 
who have died because Saddam's soldiers have thrown them from their 
incubators; we fear criminals who, if released by well‐intentioned but naive 
liberals, might prey on us. We fear  (p.23) those who might harm the young 
while thinking that they are helping them. The story that unmasks the well‐
intentioned but harmful act is powerful because it serves to warn—Dukakis's 
furloughs, the black markets produced by taxation of tobacco in Canada.
As custodians of fact, journalists need to help viewers and readers make sense of 
statements about fact while not losing sight of those facts political actors are 
reluctant to acknowledge. We make no claim that this is a simple task, but it is at 
the core of the journalist's responsibility to the public. The task becomes 
particularly difficult when the relevant facts are embedded in a compelling 
narrative.
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